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 Since the 1990s, Chinese scholarly thought has become increasingly 
diverse and has undergone signiﬁ cant reorganization. Confucian thought in 
particular has ﬂ ourished and diversiﬁ ed. Confucian trends of note are the 
value Confucianism 价值儒学 of Chen Lai 陈来, the democratic Confucianism 
民主儒学 of Wu Guang 吴光, the life Confucianism 生活儒学 of Huang Yushun 
黄玉顺, and present-day political Confucianism 政治儒学, the most active and 
popular of these trends. Though there are other schools of Confucian thought, 
this paper will cover only these four schools to keep the analysis simple and 
provide a synoptic understanding.
The Value Confucianism of Chen Lai
 Value Confucianism aﬃ  rms the value theory of Confucianism, but not 
the commonly discussed social values of Confucianism. The foundation of 
Chen Lai’s value Confucianism consists of the Confucian concept of value 
and its function in the theory. His recent interests and interpretations of 
Confucian values, including such values as responsibility, decorum 礼教, and 
the kingly way 王道, follow developments in the 1980s from the debate on 
modern culture to social-political thought. Here I present a few of his recent 
views to illustrate his philosophy.
Philosophical foundations The ontology of value Confucianism posits the 
existence of whatever is necessary for there to be benevolence 仁, which 
manifests itself in world ethics and interaction ethics. The sources of value 
Confucianism are classical benevolence studies 仁学 (stemming from A Study 
of Benevolence 仁學, by Tan Sitong 譚嗣同, 1865‒1898), the philosophy of 
Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885‒1968), who called for a revival of Confucianism, 
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and the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.1
 Chen Lai bases his methodology not on monistic universality, but on 
pluralistic universality, which explains why values in diﬀ erent cultural 
regions share some, but not all, universalities.
Value orientation He points out that the core of Confucianism is reasoning 
about values, not instrumental rationality. The social value of Confucianism is 
the social signiﬁ cance of moral reasoning. Confucian reasoning about values 
includes the inﬂ uences of modernity, the market economy, and industrializa-
tion on people’s ethical and moral lives, both in China and abroad. Hence, 
since Confucianism has its own ultimate concerns, the signiﬁ cance of 
Confucianism is both national and international.2 The core Confucian values 
of Chinese culture are benevolence, protocol, responsibility, community, and 
the kingly way.3
The point of departure for value Confucianism Value Confucianism takes 
as its point of departure that Chinese thought and practice should be 
Sinicized, that Chinese thought is universal, and that rights do not enjoy 
priority. Related to this last principle is that responsibility comes before 
freedom, that obligations are more important than rights, that community 
values matter more than the individual, and that harmony takes precedence 
over conﬂ ict. Here we see a distinct contrast with the Western perspective on 
values. Chen Lai made the following judgment about the modern value of 
individual rights and its relation to Chinese culture:
If a central principle of Western political thought regards personal rights 
and personal freedom as having ﬁ rst priority and if requiring citizens to 
practice the common good violates personal freedom, Confucianism will 
never aﬃ  rm this attitude of giving priority to rights.
China has never experienced religious persecution, nor has it fought 
colonial powers for national independence, nor have there been conﬂ icts 
between citizens and the aristocracy in Chinese history. Chinese history, 
especially in the Confucian tradition, has never given priority to an 
individual’s demands on the state or his personal rights. Confucianism 
requires rulers and the government to take responsibility and take care of 
 1 Du Weiming 杜维明 and Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑 have also discussed how the 
universe is interconnected.
 2 Chen Lai 2013.
 3 Chen Lai 2015.
63 The Main Schools of Confucianism in Present-Day Mainland China
the people, especially with regard to their economic and social well-
being. Confucianism has been the core thinking of Chinese scholar-oﬃ  -
cials for thousands of years. As a result, Confucianism has internally 
come to regard social responsibility and concern for public aﬀ airs as its 
ﬁ rst priority. Confucianism requires Chinese scholar-oﬃ  cials to focus on 
people’s livelihoods. Hence, “caring for the state while caring for the 
people” 忧国忧民 has become the spiritual tradition and inner concern of 
Confucian scholar-oﬃ  cials.4
 Chen Lai also said that concern for the people may be stronger now 
because of the special historical conditions that the Chinese suﬀ ered under in 
the nineteenth century and the development that China is experiencing now. 
Thus, China today gives ﬁ rst priority to the people, not human rights.5 
Confucianism places politics on a foundation of virtue. So there is no moral 
neutralism in politics, nor can politics be separated from morality. He 
believes that the West and the East each have their own universal concepts of 
value, founded on spiritual aspects and value aspects. Justice, freedom, rights, 
and rationality are universal, and at the same time benevolence, protocol, 
responsibility, community, and inner peace are also universal. In the Chinese 
outlook on values, since ancient times, freedom and democracy have never 
ranked ﬁ rst.6
 Here I would like to make some brief comments on Chen Lai’s value 
Confucianism. We might notice that between the value systems of the East 
and the West, there is some alignment and also some misalignment. The 
concerns of these two value systems might not be on the same level. Since 
the issues they raise are diﬀ erent, some parts are compatible. If there are 
diﬀ erent universalities, it is because they arise from diﬀ erent issues. But what 
if these diﬀ erent universalities arise from the same issue, prescribing diﬀ erent 
solutions for the same question? In this case, what kind of universality are we 
dealing with, and what is its modus operandi? Are such universalities 
diﬀ erent in nature, do they include diﬀ erent elements, or are their elements 
woven together in diﬀ erent ways? An equally important point is to take a 
realistic view of history into consideration, since history is related to the type 
of culture of a people. If the value systems of East and West refer to diﬀ erent 
levels or diﬀ erent domains, we can still discuss their universality, but it would 
be better to study them in the same issue domain.
 4 Chen Lai 2016.
 5 Chen Lai 2016.
 6 Chen Lai 2013.
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Features of value Confucianism Chen Lai does not thoroughly separate his 
value Confucianism from the trend toward greater Chinese and Western 
integration. But according to his notion of multiple universalities, Chinese 
values enjoy equal status with Western values, and Western modernity is not 
the ﬁ rst priority of value Confucianism. His value Confucianism supports 
socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Questions Chen Lai’s value Confucianism raises several questions. First, his 
notion of multiple universalities is signiﬁ cant, but it may also cause method-
ological problems. In principle, universality is monistic. Arguing for values on 
the basis of universality relies not on dialectics, but on logic. I personally 
favor monistic universality; otherwise, there is a high chance of losing 
ourselves in cultural relativism. In the last two decades, the notion of 
multiple types of modernity has led to a number of interesting ideas, but such 
multiplicities may also lead us astray.
 Second, is community an abstract conception? Is it a whole, a group, or 
a collection? Is a social group composed of individuals? Is it a whole? Or is 
it a body of related individuals, there being no absolutely independent indi-
vidual? In the Chinese worldview, people regard themselves as nodes in a 
social network. Some Confucians, especially in the Song and Ming dynasties, 
promoted the idea that in benevolence, a man sees himself as being one with 
Heaven and Earth. However, this binary relationship with the universe is 
diﬀ erent from normal relations in a social network. In my view, this holistic 
unity with Heaven and Earth recognizes that the individual is connected to 
the universe and at the same time independent.7 Since the time of the new 
Confucians of the twentieth century until now, the relationship between indi-
vidual and community has been a topic requiring clariﬁ cation.
 Third, in asserting that responsibility comes before freedom and obliga-
tions before rights, do we not need to clarify the level and domain in which 
we make this assumption? For the order and category of values in a special-
ized market society are diﬀ erent from those in a family, a social network, or 
the political ﬁ eld, because of diﬀ erent levels and domains.
The Democratic Confucianism of Wu Guang
 Like Chen Lai, Wu Guang also participated in the discussion of new 
Confucianism in the 1980s and tried to modernize Confucianism. His thought 
is based primarily on Confucianism, but owing to his historical academic 
background, he also pays attention to such philosophies as the School of the 
Yellow Emperor and Laozi 黄老道学. In addition, he shows great interest in 
 7 Li Hongwei 2014.
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democratic awareness in Chinese traditional philosophy. In particular, when 
he edited The Complete Works of Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲全集, he delighted in 
the budding awareness of the people and the promotion of their interests by 
Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲 (1610‒1695). He holds that democratic Confucianism 
is supported both aﬀ ectively and rationally. His basic positions are as 
follows:
The three periods of Confucianism Wu Guang’s overview of Confucianism 
is based on the notion of body 体 versus function 用. He states that traditional 
Confucianism had its own body and function, namely a body of benevolence 
仁 and a function of decorum 礼, and that the new Confucianism will develop 
its own body and function. With changes in content come changes in form. 
On this basis, he introduced three periods in the development of 
Confucianism. The ﬁ rst period was classical Confucianism. The second 
period extended from Kang Youwei 康有为 (1858‒1927) to the new 
Confucianism of the twentieth century. The third period is the democratic 
Confucianism now taking shape, with a new body and new function.8 
According to Wu Guang, the new Confucianism of Kang Youwei and Mou 
Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909‒1995) was limited to elite discussion among intellec-
tuals and in academic forums. Their thought never exercised a strong spiritual 
power capable of guiding society and the public. Most important, they did not 
separate themselves from the idealistic theory of mind and human nature 心
性学 of the Song (960‒1279) and Ming (1368‒1644) dynasties. Their new 
Confucianism lacked a new body and function capable of facing life, the 
public, and the contemporary age.9
 I see no major problems with Wu Guang’s ﬁ rst period of Confucianism. 
But the second period he sees as a reactive Confucianism. This view, I think, 
applies only to Kang Youwei’s Confucianism, not to a fully developed 
Confucianism. Not all new Confucianism (for example, Mou Zongsan’s 
philosophy) is reactive. New Confucianism is both constructive and system-
atic. Such construction and creative reconstruction are based on acknowl-
edging basic values and responding to contemporary requirements. I do not 
think that new Confucianism is entangled in airy discussions of nature and 
mind. Indeed, new Confucianism has had to face the public and society. In the 
twentieth century it had to respond to challenges from scientism, materialism, 
and indiscriminate Westernization and has had to redeﬁ ne the value of 
Chinese culture in the face of these challenges. These multiple tasks facing 
contemporary Confucianism are primarily intellectual in nature. 
 8 Wu Guang 2014.
 9 Wu Guang 2014.
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Contemporary Confucianism, in my view, needs to develop its roots by 
combining Confucius 孔子 (551‒479 BCE), Mencius 孟子 (372‒289 BCE), the 
study of mind and nature 心性学, and the study of innate knowledge of the 
good 良知学 with new Confucianism and a future democratic life for the 
Chinese people. So democratic Confucianism is feasible, although my 
approach diﬀ ers somewhat from that of Wu Guang.
The basic idea of democratic Confucianism Wu Guang states that democ-
racy is partially a metaphysical concept and not just a practical institutional 
form.10 Because democracy has metaphysical features, we can understand Wu 
Guang as regarding democracy as the Way 道, the metaphysical notion of 
Confucianism. He tells us that democracy has one way and ﬁ ve virtues 一道
五德, that democracy has benevolence as body and science and law as func-
tion 仁爱为体, 科技法治为用. The way of benevolence consists of the ﬁ ve 
virtues, namely, righteousness 义, decorum 礼, trustworthiness 信, harmony 和, 
and respect 敬. This new theory of benevolence arose from Confucius’s 
notion of benevolence and inherits the revisions of the later classical 
Confucian tradition. Yet it also learns from non-Confucian areas of culture, 
especially Western thought and intellectual resources (such as democracy, 
freedom, equality, love, human rights, law, etc.), while it criticizes and rejects 
antihumanistic thought and institutions (such as the supremacy of individual 
rights, the idea of conquest, and the notion of survival of the ﬁ ttest). This 
moral humanistic philosophy emphasizes morality and cares about the 
meaning and value of life in seeking to support people’s livelihoods. In 
practice, it does not follow the traditional path of sageliness within and 
kingliness without 内圣外王, that is, being a sage within and exercising the 
outward moral authority of a king. Rather, it seeks to unify a new sageliness 
within and a new kingliness without. It requires every individual to be a 
gentleman with a benevolent and democratic personality, to serve the 
community, and to build a moral society. It requires setting up community 
and national organizations that represent the will of the community, and that 
respect democratic and benevolent public morality, civilized decorum, and 
contemporary political and judicial institutions, in order to implement demo-
cratic and benevolent policies and to use scientiﬁ c power to beneﬁ t the 
people.11
 In Wu Guang’s opinion, many scholars misinterpret democracy as a 
practical political institution, or even as means of waging political battles. 
This is wrong. Rather, democracy has an institutional, spiritual, and concep-
10 I will detail my views on this issue in other essays.
11 Wu Guang 2014, 2013.
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tual nature, in which the spiritual and conceptual aspects matter more. 
Democracy is a reﬂ ection of the people’s self-awareness and self-determina-
tion. Democratic institutions are established with a democratic spirit. So 
democracy is a manifestation of the Way, and the contemporary democratic 
spirit and traditional spirit of benevolence can be united. How to coordinate 
the relation between democracy and benevolence in a democratic, benevolent 
society is a focus of public attention. In Wu Guang’s view, the union of 
democracy and benevolence is a union of Western and Eastern values. This 
manifestation of the Way is both democratic and benevolent.12
Features of democratic benevolence Moral reason orients theory. In this 
respect, Wu Guang’s democratic Confucianism is similar to Chen Lai’s value 
Confucianism. However, Wu Guang takes democracy as a body, wherein he 
parts company with Chen Lai’s value Confucianism. Another feature of this 
theory is that it combines a new body and a new function in which Chinese 
culture and Western culture come together.
Problems Wu Guang has yet to give clear deﬁ nitions of his notions of 
benevolence and democracy, and to specify the relations between them. His 
theory is richly suggestive, but is still vague about the nature of democracy as 
the embodiment of the Way, the signiﬁ cance of benevolence as an ontological 
given, and the implications of democracy and benevolence as a common 
ontological entity, namely, the body of the Way 道体. Hence, his exposition 
sometimes lapses into obscurity. For example, Gan Chunsong 干春松 wonders 
whether democracy is a metaphysical construct.13 This question must be 
answered, and it can be answered thus: Democracy is not merely individuals 
voting in an institutional arrangement. In this conceptual framework for 
democracy, the concept comes ﬁ rst, the lifestyle second, and the institutional 
arrangement third. This is the meaning behind the notion that democracy is 
the body of the Way.
The Life Confucianism of Huang Yushun
 The life Confucianism of Huang Yushun is an eclectic mixture of a 
Confucian emotional theory of ethics 情感伦理学, the theory of Mencius, and 
the theory of Xunzi 荀子 (313‒238 BCE), and also absorbs concepts from 
Western phenomenology. He holds negative attitude toward the 
Neo-Confucianism 理学 of the Song and Ming dynasties, which in his view is 
an abstract and transcendental theory. His aim is to make Confucianism 
12 Wu Guang 2014.
13 Wu Guang, Pang Jinyuo, and Gan Chunsong 2014.
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realistic. Although he criticizes other philosophers for their abstract, transcen-
dental thinking, his phenomenology might have similar problems. This is a 
point where his life Confucianism needs to be further explained.
The basic ideas of life Confucianism Huang Yushun especially emphasizes 
that “Confucianism is a kind of belief 信仰.” “There is no new version of 
Confucianism, because after the Hundred Schools of Thought 诸子百家争鸣, 
so-called Confucianism was never a school but a belief. This kind of belief 
originates from the emotion of actual practical life concerns, the emotional 
experience of benevolence 仁爱情感. This kind of emotion has nothing to do 
with historical evolution. Thus I would like to say that humans are Confucian 
by nature.”14
 This view of his, which comes from phenomenology, particularly 
emphasizes the notion of existence. He states, “What is life is existence.” In 
his view, in the preclassical and classical periods of Confucianism, if exis-
tence precedes the origin of any particular existent, then what is life is exis-
tence, and what is excluded from life is nonexistence. Everything originates 
in life and is attributed to life.15
 Huang Yushun uses the word “aﬀ ection” 情爱 to illustrate the origin and 
foundation of life existence. He is here referring to the emotional experience 
of benevolence, which is diﬀ erent from the ontology of emotions of Li 
Zehou 李泽厚. The emotional experience of benevolence is the origin of life, 
the presentation of life. It is the essence of emotion in the Confucianism of 
Confucius and Mencius. This stance contrasts with the view of emotion 
found in post-Qin Confucianism in such notions as “Human nature is the root 
and emotion the branches” 性本情末, “Human nature is the body and emotion 
the function” 性体情用, and “Human nature is good and emotion evil” 性善情
恶.16
Point of departure, fundamentals, and features Huang Yushun’s special 
areas of expertise are phenomenology and Xunzi. His biggest concern for our 
life is the lack of the emotional experience of benevolence in contemporary 
society.17 This, I think, is the biggest problem facing China since the May 
4th Movement (May 4, 1919). In his view, benevolence is based on natural 
emotion and is distinct from indiscriminate universal love 博爱. He speaks of 
the equality of everything before benevolence 万物一体之仁, a theory that 
14 Huang Yushun 2008b.
15 Huang Yushun 2008a, 2005a, 2005b.
16 Huang Yushun 2008b.
17 Huang Yushun 2008b.
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originated with Mencius, but he does not have a deep understanding of this 
theory, and this has aﬀ ected his theory of emotion. Finally, his life 
Confucianism rejects liberalism on the one hand and Confucian fundamen-
talism on the other.
Value and problems Huang Yushun’s life Confucianism follows an impor-
tant line of thought in the Confucian tradition and for this reason is of great 
value. Yet there are also problems with his thought:
•  His focus lies in the continuity of the Confucian tradition as a whole. He 
tries to connect the Confucianism of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi with 
the rationalism 理学 of Zhu Xi 朱熹, Cheng Hao 程颢, and Cheng Yi 程颐, 
and the idealism 心学 of Lu Jiuyuan 陆九渊 and Wang Yangming 王阳明. 
Obviously, there is some self-contradiction, such as no clear distinction of 
levels of application. Huang Yushun tries to cover both neo-Confucian 
rationalism and idealism, but ends up missing part of each.
•  His speculative philosophical discussion is prolix and repetitive. He does 
not clarify Heidegger’s concept of existence very well. It appears that his 
understanding of Heidegger’s notion of existence is shallow, inaccurate, or 
misdirected.
•  Huang Yushun’s concept of life is confused. He accepts Husserl’s phenom-
enology and notion of a lifeworld (Lebenswelt) and raises the Daoist theo-
ries of Laozi 老子 and Zhuangzi 庄子 as support for life as a basic given. 
However, this contradicts his positing “an ontology of emotions” 情感本体 
in Confucianism.
•  Huang Yushun lacks suﬃ  cient understanding of Song and Ming neo-
Confucianism and Confucian humanism to criticize Song neo-Confu-
cianism. The biggest problem is that although his life Confucianism has a 
humanistic point of departure, it fails to connect humanism and an 
emotional theory of ethics and cannot carve out a logical space for itself in 
the area of spiritual humanism. Hence, his theory of benevolence is not 
soundly rooted in, have suﬃ  cient continuity with, or conform adequately to 
the logic of, Confucianism.
•  Because he emphasizes an ontology of emotion, his Confucianism cannot 
eﬃ  ciently absorb basic concepts from Song and Ming neo-Confucianism 
and the contemporary Western theory of justice.
 The Confucian theories discussed above are centered on the theory of 
benevolence 仁学, while the following political Confucianism theories focus 
on decorum (protocol in a political context) 礼学 and the classical texts 经学.
Present-Day Political Confucianism
 Political Confucianism is the largest area of Confucianism in contempo-
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rary mainland China and boasts of many outstanding scholars. To extensively 
cover the ﬁ eld, I would need to present a huge amount of material. Because 
of limited space, I will just look at some representative ﬁ gures and make a 
few brief comments.
Jiang Qing Because the thought of Jiang Qing 蒋庆 has received ample 
discussion in the literature, I will not explain his thought in detail here. I will 
limit my explanations to features common in political Confucianism and 
representative of the ﬁ eld.
 Jiang Qing criticizes contemporary new Confucianism and advocates 
political Confucianism. He has a basic understanding of Wang Yangming 
idealism 阳明学 and the theory of innate knowledge of the good 良知学, but 
he lacks suﬃ  cient understanding to unify the spirit and humanism of political 
Confucianism. So he returns to the thought of Xunzi and Dong Zhongshu 董
仲舒 (179‒104 BCE), who asserted that the Way of Heaven 天道 is external 
and transcendental to humans. Other scholars of political Confucianism, he 
argues, do not suﬃ  ciently understand either the spiritual humanism of 
Confucianism or the neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties.
 He is ﬁ rmly committed to extreme conservatism and cultural nationalism. 
For instance, he criticizes almost all Western concepts, such as human rights, 
democratic values, equality, etc. He insists that the Way of Heaven has the 
capacity to govern human societies, but that this requires that the political 
framework to respond to the Way of Heaven.18 He also proposes that 
Confucian scholars supervise the state’s public aﬀ airs 太学监国. He advocates 
that government be divided into three branches, that scholars engage in poli-
tics, and the nation be ruled according to scholarly traditions. He promotes 
the spirit of decorum and recommends doing away with judicial litigation 无
讼. Finally, he stresses the traditional kingly way and a distinction between 
China and other nations in domestic and international politics.19
Yao Zhongqiu The point of departure for Yao Zhongqiu 姚中秋 is to use 
China’s own thought and logic, shaped over its long history, to explain 
present-day China. He thinks that after the enlightenments of the twentieth 
century, Chinese thought and the Chinese spirit need to undergo a renewal. 
China’s current problem is neither survival nor self-defense, but to create a 
Chinese order of world signiﬁ cance. This requires Chinese scholars to trace 
back to the origins of the traditional Chinese order to explore its basic princi-
18 See Li Hongwei 2014, 2015.
19 Jiang Qing 2003, 2011.
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ples.20
 Traditional Chinese society was massive in scale and was governed from 
multiple centers. Hence, Zhou rites, music, and feudal system were appro-
priate in the Zhou dynasty, he argues. China’s huge size, which made it 
impossible to govern by simply dividing people into citizens and noncitizens, 
led to multiple levels and centers of public life and also deﬁ ned diﬀ erent 
levels of citizen identiﬁ cation. For instance, Chinese governance included 
individual cultivation, family and clan management, as well as national 
governance.21 The primary focus of political Confucianism is politics guided 
by scholars trained in the Confucian tradition, but he also sees the extended 
family as civil society and the public arena in traditional Chinese society. In 
his view, rule 治道 is the administrative management 政道 of government. 
Political thought seeks to create norms and a social order in accord with his 
classical conservatism.22
 Yao Zhongqiu argues that the debate between Deng Xiaomang 邓晓芒 and 
Liu Xiaofeng 刘小枫 on China’s direction and the interpretation of its philo-
sophical tradition was actually a debate about the other in international rela-
tions. These two debaters regarded themselves as original thinkers, but they 
were merely conveying Western thinking. Their debate led in an ugly fashion 
to the end of parroting foreign thought in the twentieth century.23
 The value of Yao Zhongqiu’s thought is that he proposes a personal 
understanding of governing a massive society such as China’s and supple-
ments the idea of Qian Mu 钱穆 (1895‒1990) that Chinese politics be guided 
by scholars trained in the Confucian tradition. His thought is also important 
for his view that Chinese civilization sustains the story of China’s contempo-
rary rise, and that the Chinese way 中国之道 is a viable alternative to that of 
the West.
 There are three problems with Yao Zhongqiu’s thinking: First, saying that 
the advances of the last thirty years were inherent in Chinese civilization, he 
denies that the two enlightenments of the twentieth century had any beneﬁ cial 
eﬀ ect on Chinese social values and practices. His explanations fall short of 
those of Deng Zhenglai 邓正来 and some economists. Second, his discussion 
barely covers the basic deﬁ nitions of and divisions between public power and 
individual rights. Both Yao Zhongqiu and Jiang Qing accept Mou Zongsan’s 
concept of “the three orthodoxies” 三统 (the three distinct lines of transmis-
sion of legitimate social authority, namely, transmission of the Way 道统, 
20 Yao Zhongqiu 2014b.
21 Yao Zhongqiu 2014a.
22 Ren Feng et al. 2015; Yao Zhongqiu 2015.
23 Yao Zhongqiu 2014b.
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transmission of Confucian knowledge 学统, and transmission of political 
power 政统) while trying completely to deny it. These diﬀ erences within 
Confucianism are even larger than the diﬀ erences between Confucianism and 
liberalism. Like Jiang Qing’s seeking to do away with judicial litigation, Yao 
Zhongqiu’s thought ignores the diﬀ erence between personal cultivation and 
public life. Third, Yao Zhongqiu, from the perspectives of liberalism and 
socialism, makes no distinction between ruler and citizen. The universality of 
citizenship and the equality of citizens’ rights disappear in his discussion.
Chen Ming According to Chen Ming 陈明, Confucian values are utilitarian. 
He says that pursuing truth is the goal of science, and putting knowledge to 
use is the ﬁ rst principle of culture. Calling a theory the truth is a rhetorical 
device that tries to make a proposition persuasive, lower its cost, and have it 
take root in society. Religion is a perfect example.24
 Thought and scholarship should respond to the needs of the living to 
survive. He writes, “If we understand present-day Confucianism in this 
framework, we need to adopt the following attitude: Reject a Confucian 
fundamentalism that makes core Confucian propositions pure theoretical or 
metaphysical, for this isolates Confucianism from the lived world. Also reject 
a Confucian liberalism that, by establishing a corpus of knowledge, cuts itself 
oﬀ  from the main body of the Confucian enterprise. Our belief that the logic 
of life comes before culture distinguishes us from Confucian fundamentalists, 
and our belief that Confucianism best promotes the survival of the Chinese 
race distinguishes us from Confucian liberals.”25 “I have always believed that 
the revival of Confucianism depends on its accepting the mission of present-
day culture. It cannot and should not set itself up as the ﬁ nal arbitrator of 
values.”26
 In Chen Ming’s view, the desire of a people to survive is the basis of 
nationalism. Everything else is optional or a matter of expression, even when 
it comes to liberalism or socialism.27
 His basic thrust is that he wants to make Confucianism into a civil religion. 
“Confucianism, as a civil religion, gives Chinese individuals, as members of 
the political community, a political and legal identity and a sense of the 
common good. These notions, which have internal connections with ethnic 
culture, need to accord with individual historical contexts and living spaces, 
and need us to foster and construct them.”28 There are three important points 
24 Chen Ming 2008.
25 Chen Ming 2008.
26 Chen Ming 2008.
27 Chen Ming 2008.
28 Chen Ming 2012.
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that we should gather from this passage. First, Confucianism as a civil reli-
gion is an expression of politics and legitimacy. Second, Confucianism 
includes common values, perceptions, and norms. Third, Confucianism 
requires human construction. “There are two functions of civil religion. The 
ﬁ rst function is to give politics a foundation of values, that is, to regulate and 
legitimize politics. In a sense, Dong Zhongshu carried out this project in the 
Han dynasty by making Confucianism a civil religion and using it to provide 
politics with a foundation of values. The second function is to provide a 
cultural understanding in order to strengthen a sense of nationalism.”29
 The value of Chen Ming’s thought is his proposals for reconstructing 
ethnic culture, but the strong political implications of his program make it less 
attractive. His theory has evident weaknesses. He does not judge Confucian 
values and is only concerned about Confucianism’s function. He does not 
comment on whether Confucianism is good and cares only about whether it 
is useful. For instance, he oﬀ ers no analysis of diﬀ erent traditional schools of 
Confucianism, nor does he oﬀ er any judgments on the connection between 
Confucianism and an individual’s life. His only concern is about the impact 
Confucianism may have on national integration. His views have a strong 
nationalist component, but ignore the eﬀ ects of Confucian values on indi-
vidual survival and its potential impact on the reconstruction of community.
Synopsis of Present-Day Confucianism in Mainland China
 The Confucian theories presented above all have some characteristics in 
common. First, they all aﬃ  rm the universality of Confucianism. Second, they 
share a common attitude on putting Confucianism into practice. They all are 
dedicated to promoting Confucianism in the private sector, such as estab-
lishing academies, encouraging Confucian book clubs, promoting the reading 
of Confucian classics, etc. Though they share these general characteristics, 
the diﬀ erences among these Confucian theories are huge.
 Here I would like to point out three methodological problems. First, Chen 
Lai proposes the “re-Sinicization of the ruling party,” as opposed to various 
modes of Westernization. However, the term “re-Sinicization” needs to be 
reconsidered, since it has associations with evaluations of the two enlighten-
ment movements in the twentieth century. We need a term that is more 
objective and politically neutral. Second, the notion in political Confucianism 
of “using China to explain China” is biased and unwarranted. China began 
modernizing after the world economic system had formed and developed. 
China’s modernization—including its initialization (the idea of moderniza-
tion), launch (the social movement and political and economic reforms), and 
29 Chen Ming 2012.
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fruits (joining the World Trade Organization)—were all realized within a 
process of world modernization. So China’s modernization is part of world 
modernization and cannot be considered independent self-development. We 
cannot explain China without considering the process of world modernization 
and Western cultural impacts. Third, we cannot deploy the idea of “using 
China to explain China” to deﬁ ne the direction of future Chinese develop-
ment. The best we can do is to use the new-Confucian concept of the inte-
gration of Chinese and Western systems in the twentieth century to explain 
China’s recent history and the direction of future development.
 Political Confucianism in particular focuses on governance and order, 
instead of individual claims of human rights and restraints on public power. 
This characteristic of some mainland new-Confucian theories may also be a 
shortcoming. In the late twentieth century—amidst the rise of China and 
decline of America, the world economic crisis, European stagnation, and 
regression in the European Union—assessing eﬃ  ciency and eﬀ ects became 
increasingly popular. This led to such notions as technocracy, philosophoc-
racy (government by Confucian scholars), and democracy as a simple 
response to the people’s needs. Such thinking values purpose over motivation 
and results over process and easily led to the illusion of great Chinese prog-
ress, because it reviewed history from an abstract, bird’s-eye perspective. Yao 
Zhongqiu’s description of the Zhou and Song dynasties and some scholars’ 
aﬃ  rmation of well-ordered societies in European history also fell into this 
trap. In my view, in contrast, political progress requires speciﬁ c methods 
instead of abstract historical judgments. Simple theses and antitheses easily 
lead to errors.
 The three patterns in mainland new Confucianism involve a focus on 
benevolence (democratic Confucianism), on decorum (political Confucianism 
with its emphasis of study of the classics), or on a combination of the two 
(value Confucianism). I personally insist on assigning diﬀ erent roles to 
thought and culture. In the realm of thought, I recommend reading the great 
thinkers of the world, including Western Christian philosophers, and in the 
area of culture, I recommend Confucianism. These two realms are at diﬀ erent 
levels and should not be thought to be on the same level. Confucianism at the 
cultural and secular level should not reject Christianity or Buddhism. The 
future of Chinese society should be built on a healthy base of diﬀ erent reli-
gions thriving together, with Confucianism being but one religion in a 
multireligious society. It is unrealistic and also impossible to ban other philo-
sophical trends and venerate only Confucianism.
 Oﬃ  cial promotion of Confucianism, while not as foundational as Dong 
Zhongshu’s promotion of Confucianism in the Han dynasty, suggests viewing 
Confucianism as a “civil religion.” Though the term is vague and hard to 
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deﬁ ne, I am referring to Robert Bellah’s notion of civil religion, not Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s.30 It involves cultivating the mind and one’s human 
nature and is a key ingredient in the formation of democracy—a notion that 
de Tocqueville would hardily agree with.
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